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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurial spawning—the process whereby an existing firm gives birth to a new firm set up
by one or more employees departed from the existing firm—is prevalent in many new industries. It
is well-known, for example, that Fairchild Semiconductors has been the forebear of a great many
Silicon Valley semiconductor firms, the “mother hen of the Northern California semiconductor
industry” (Rogers, 1985, p. 24). In his history of the genesis of Silicon Valley, Hall (1998, p. 437)
writes “about half of the eighty-five or so US semiconductor companies of the 1980s were direct
spin-offs from the firm.”1 It is perhaps less well-known that similar statements can be made about
many industries: disk drives (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, and Sarkar, 2004; Christensen, 1993;
Franco and Filson, 2006), lasers (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Sherer, 2006), tires (Buenstorf and
Klepper, 2009), and automobiles (Klepper, 2007).
The phenomenon of entrepreneurial spawning—also referred to as spinning off or spinning out—
has been quite extensively studied. Less studied have been the implications of spawning for a variety
of firm characteristics such as size, focus, profitability, and innovativeness. We believe that a better
understanding of these implications can contribute towards a better understanding of the nature of
the firm. Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) have studied empirically the relation of spawning
with firm characteristics. The present paper develops a model that does so theoretically. Its results
generally coincide with Gompers, Lerner, and Scharsftein’s findings. The paper also examines the
dynamics of spawning over time and their implications for the evolution of firm characteristics.
Finally, the paper examines the extent and the profitability of entry by spawning: it computes
the number of spawned entrants into a new industry and compares the profitability of entry by
spawned firms with diversifying entry by firms active in other industries.
As our results revolve around the nature and the extent of spawning, it is natural to ask what
determines spawning: why should an employee that has developed a new product start a new firm
to commercialize that product? We motivate spawning by the desire to achieve organizational fit,
that is, the fit between a firm’s organization and the requirements for the successful management
of the firm’s product portfolio.2 In our model, spawning occurs where the employee who developed
the new product finds it beneficial to start a new firm to commercialize that product, because the
1Hall (1998) cites Hanson (1982, p. 110) who observes that “[[t]hroughout the sixties, bright young engineers spun
out of Fairchild like so many enterprizing Minervas from the head of Zeus. New start-ups abounded: three new chip
makers in 1966, another three in 1967, thirteen in 1968, eight more in 1969; their names a seemingly endless set of
permutations on a few basic syllables — tech, tronic, inter, micro, ics, tron, etc.”
2Roberts (2004, p.11) writes that “there needs to be a fit between strategy and organization and between these
and the technological, legal, and competitive environment.”
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product presents little fit with the organizational form of the firm at which the employee originally
is employed. The employee bargains with the firm over the term of his departure. The benefit of
spawning is the choice of an organizational form better suited to the new product; its cost that
of setting up the new firm. There is a threshold organizational fit: products whose fit with firm
organization exceeds the threshold are retained within the original firm, those whose fit does not
are spawned to new firms.
Spawning naturally has consequences for firm characteristics. Ceteris paribus, a firm that
spawns more grows more slowly: products that otherwise would be retained within the firm are
spawned to new firms. Spawning increases firm focus: as it is lesser fitting products that are
spawned to new firms, a greater extent of spawning increases the average fit of those products
retained within the firm, that is, it increases firm focus. As focus improves profitability, ceteris
paribus, spawning increases firm profitability, too. Finally, spawning increases a firm’s investment
in innovation: a product spawned generally is more profitable, because it is sold by a new firm
with form of organization better fitting the product. Greater product profitability increases the
incentive to invest in innovation. This last result underlines the importance of the ceteris paribus
qualification: larger incentives to innovate will lead to a greater number of new products that may
increase firm size, despite the spawning of a larger fraction of these products; the relation between
spawning and firm size is therefore ambiguous.
In order to study the dynamics of spawning over time and its implications for the evolution of
firm characteristics, we introduce the—hitherto unnecessary—assumption that the cost of setting
up a new firm increases over time: as a new industry develops and firms active in the industry
acquire new knowledge through learning-by-doing for example, it becomes costlier for new firms
seeking to enter the industry to acquire or replicate the body of knowledge these firms would need
in order successfully to operate in the industry. The frequency of spawning therefore decreases over
time. The decline in spawning naturally has implications for size, which grows over time; for focus,
which decreases; for profitability, which decreases; and for innovativeness, which decreases.
As spawning constitutes the exclusive cause of new firm creation in our model, the decline in
spawning implies a decline in the rate of new firm creation. The number of new firms may however
increase in the early stages of an industry, as the decline in the rate of new firm creation is offset by
the larger number of firms from which new firms are spawned. The former eventually dominates,
at which point the number of new firms declines.
We compare entry by spawning and diversifying entry, that is entry by firms active in other
industries. Laux’s (1976) study of the early automobile industry in France reveals that many at-
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tempts at car manufacturing were undertaken by existing bicycle and coach manufacturers. Klep-
per’s (2002) study of the industry in and around Detroit finds that spawned firms—firms founded
by individuals previously employed by existing car manufacturers—performed at least as well as di-
versifying firms. Klepper and Thompson (2009) provide a disagreements-based theoretical rationale
for this finding. We revisit this issue in the context of our model. We show that diversifying firms
have lower value of fit than spawned firms; diversifying entry is therefore less profitable than entry
by spawning, unless diversifying firms have markedly higher value of skills than their spawned coun-
terparts. This is consistent with the view that it is firms with less specific, more general resources
that choose to diversify (Bernardo and Chowdhry, 2002; Matsusaka, 2001).
We view our model as pertaining primarily to new firms in the early stages of a new industry.
This is reflected in the assumptions that we make. We assume a firm is owned by the individuals
that constitute the firm’s human capital, the scientists, engineers, and other technical and non-
technical personnel that devise various innovations and choose whether to have these retained
within the firm or spawned to a new firm. We further assume that a new firm spawned from
an existing firm has access to the same ‘innovation technology’ as does the existing, spawning
firm. This assumption–true in the early stages in a new industry, as when Intel was spawned from
Fairchild in 1968—has the important benefit of imparting no built-in advantage or disadvantage
to firm size. In our model, a larger firm innovates more or less than its smaller counterpart not
because of some inherent property of large or small firms, but because the underlying parameters
that make firms larger or smaller also make them more or less innovative.
Many of our predictions appear to be consistent with the available empirical evidence: firms
that have higher patent quality and younger firms spawn more (Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein,
2005), as do firms that have higher knowhow (Franco and Filson, 2006). All of our predictions
are induced by spawning, but some extend beyond spawning: older firms are also more diversified
(Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997) and less profitable (Loderer and Waelchli, 2009). Some of our
predictions are new and may help shed new light on issues perhaps still controversial. Consider
for example the spawning-induced relation between focus and profitability. Our work suggests that
these two endogenous firm characteristics are positively related where the relation is driven by the
value of organizational fit; they may be negatively related where the relation is driven by the value
of firm skills. This may account for the somewhat mixed evidence regarding the relation between
focus/diversification and performance/value.3 Our model is also able to account for the finding by
3There is an extensive literature on the relation between diversification and performance, starting with the seminal
work of Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994). See for example Campa and Kedia (2002); Graham,
Lemmon, and Wolf (2002); Schoar (2002); Villalonga (2004); and Whited (2001).
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Loderer and Waelchli (2009) that firms become less profitable as they mature. Our analysis shows
that this finding, which is difficult to reconcile with the view of firm growth as being driven by
increased firm resources, skills, and/or knowhow (Klette and Kortum, 2004; Penrose, 1995), can
be simply explained by the decline in spawning, thereby focus, over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the model.
Section 4 solves the model for firm value and the extent of spawning. Section 5 examines the firm
characteristics of interest and derives their comparative statics. Section 6 examines the dynamics
of spawning over time and their implications for the evolution of firm characteristics. Section 7
examines the extent of entry by spawning and compares the profitability such entry with diver-
sifying entry. Section 8 provides supporting empirical evidence and derives a number of testable
implications. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our work is related to various strands of the literature. It is of course related to the literature
on spawning, which has sought to explain when an innovation is retained to be implemented ‘in-
house’ and when it is spawned to a new firm.4 It is also related to the literature on firm size
and firm growth, that part of the literature in particular that has attributed a firm’s growth to
the firm’s entry into new submarkets (Klepper and Thompson, 2006; Klette and Kortum, 2004;
Sutton, 1998): our products are these papers’ submarkets.5 Finally, it is related to the literature on
firm focus and diversification, in particular that part of the literature which has sought to explain
why diversification might create value despite being associated with lower average firm value and
performance.6
Where previous work has examined each of the issues mentioned above in much detail, our work
attempts to tie these together in one single model which, as noted above, accounts for firm size,
performance, focus, and innovativeness, and for the extent of spawning by the firm. What ties these
together is organizational fit: fit i) determines individual product profitability, therefore determin-
ing the incentive to invest in the development of new products, i.e., innovativeness, ii) determines
4See for example Amador and Landier (2002); Anton and Yao (1995); De Bettignies and Chemla (2008), Cassiman
and Ueda (2006); Franco and Filson (2006); Gromb and Scharfstein (2002); Hellmann (2007); and Klepper and
Thompson (2009).
5There is a large literature on firm size and firm growth that is surveyed in Sutton (1997) and Coad (2009).
6See for example Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002); Gomes and Livdan (2004); Maksimovic and Phillips (2002);
Matsusaka (2001); and Matsusaka and Nanda (2002).
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the products the firm introduces itself and those the firm leaves to the firms it spawns, thereby
determining size, and iii) determines overall firm profitability through focus, that is, average organi-
zational fit. Our focus on organizational fit i) accounts for the decision to spawn without appealing
to additional considerations such as contractual flexibility, intellectual property rights, multi-task
agency, the distinction between innovation and imitation, or disagreements and ii) accounts for
product diversification without the need for internal capital markets, winner-picking skills, or de-
creasing returns to scale.7 We do not doubt the importance of these and other considerations, but
believe there is a value to a common explanation with a single consideration.8
Our paper is closest to Cassiman and Ueda (2006) and to Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein
(2005). We follow Cassiman and Ueda in stressing the importance and exploring the implications of
organizational fit. Where Cassiman and Ueda examine the process of spawning in great detail, we
explore its implications for firm characteristics and for rate and form of entry. We follow Gompers,
Lerner, and Scharfstein in examining the relation between spawning and firm characteristics. Where
their analysis is empirical, ours is theoretical.
Klepper and Thompson (2009, p. 12) take issue with organizational fit-based rationales for
spawning such as ours, based on incumbents’ “limited ability or capacity to manage diverse
projects.” They view these explanations as being contradicted by the observations that i) most
of the disagreements they report were central to spawning firms’ missions and ii) better performing
firms spawned more; the firms they spawned in turn performed better. We note that there need be
no contradiction between limited ability or capacity and centrality once one recognizes that organi-
zational fit applies as much to market or process as to product. Consider for example Christensen’s
(1997) finding, reported by Cassiman and Ueda (2006, p. 271), that “two-thirds of the spin-offs
in the hard disk drive industry entered new submarkets, which did not fit the established firms’
7Regarding i), Amador and Landier (2002) induce spawning by attributing greater contractual flexibility to ex-
ternal, venture capital financing than to internal financing; Anton and Yao (1995) and Hellmann (2007) make the
decision to spawn revolve around the allocation of intellectual property rights and, in the case of Hellmann, the need
to induce an employee to exert effort on a core task where the employee might otherwise be tempted to exert effort
on another, innovative task; Franco and Filson (2006) limit innovation to firms and employees to imitation; they
induce spawning by requiring that an employee who wishes to innovate start his own firm; Klepper and Thompson
(2009) attribute the decision to spawn to disagreements between employer and employee. Regarding ii), Fluck and
Lynch (1999), Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), Matsusaka and Nanda (2002), and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales
(2000) study internal capital markets in conglomerates; Stein (1997) studies winner-picking skills; Gomes and Livdan
(2004) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) study decreasing returns to scale.
8We follow Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) and Matsusaka (2001) in introducing a distinction between general
and specific resources; such distinction does not, however, play as central a role in prompting diversification in our
work as in theirs: diversification would occur in our model even absent general resources.
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existing customer base.” An established hard disk drive manufacturer that had been presented the
opportunity to develop a new disk drive for a new market segment might quite reasonably have
concluded that it did not have the ability or capacity to service the new segment, despite disk
drives being central to the manufacturer’s mission. We establish the greater extent of spawning by
better performing firms and the better performance spawned firms in Sections 5 and 7; we discuss
these in Section 8.
3 The Model
3.1 The Firm
Consider a firm f set up in a period tf at a cost κtf ∈ R+. Firm f has three characteristics that
are central to our analysis: its organizational form, its portfolio of products, and its human capital.
• The firm’s organizational form, mf , is represented by a point on the real line, R; the firm
chooses its form of organization upon set up; organizational imprint and inertia (Carroll and
Hannan, 2000; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001) combine to make that choice irreversible.
• The firm is born with a single product, θf ∈ R for firm f . Innovations provide the firm with
the opportunity to introduce new products; these too are represented by points on the real
line. We denote by Ift the portfolio of products of firm f in period t; Ift represents the
products introduced by the firm between periods tf and t. We let Ift ≡ |Ift| denote the
number of products in Ift.
• The firm’s human capital, A, consists of the set of agents who own the firm, devise the firm’s
innovations, and choose whether to have these retained within the firm or spawned to a new
firm (see Section 3.2 below).9 We assume agents are homogeneous; we let A ≡ |A| denote the
number of agents in A; A is assumed constant over time.10 At the start of period t > tf , every
agent a ∈ A attempts to devise an innovation. The agent chooses a probability qt at a cost
to the agent c(qt); qt is the probability that the agent is successful at devising an innovation.
9It is perhaps most natural to think of these agents as the scientists, engineers, and other key technical and non-
technical personnel who founded the firm or joined it soon afterwards, develop and market its products, and make
its main decisions. The firm may employ other personnel such as clerical and production workers, but these need not
be modeled explicitly as they generally have little ownership in the firm and neither devise innovations nor affect the
decision whether to retain or to spawn.
10The number of agents, A, may be considered the result of some unmodeled optimization.
6
We consider a symmetric equilibrium for simplicity. We assume
c(qt) =
ζ
2
q 2t . (1)
The parameter ζ ∈ R+ measures the difficulty of innovation. The probabilities qt are assumed
independent across agents and time.11
An innovation provides the firm with the opportunity to introduce a new product, θi ∈ R. We
assume θi is uniformly distributed over an interval of length 2δ centered at firm f ’s organizational
form, mf : θi ∼ U [mf − δ,mf + δ]: organizational form determines the—greater or lesser—range of
possible innovations.
We define organizational fit ωi ∈ (0, 1) to be the complement of the normalized distance between
organizational form mf and product θi: ωi ≡ 1 −
∣∣∣ θi−mfδ ∣∣∣. The fit is maximal (ωi = 1) where the
new product coincides with organizational form, θi = mf ; it is minimal (ωi = 0) where the new
product is most peripheral, θi = mf ± δ.
Organizational fit, the fit between the product and the firm’s organizational form, combines
with firm skills to determine the per-period profit to firm f from selling product θi. Specifically,
pii = α+ β ωi. (2)
The parameter α measures the value of firm skills. The parameter β measures the value of orga-
nizational fit, ωi: the larger β, the greater the profit β ωi attributable to organizational fit. Note
that such profit would be zero if fit were zero (ωi = 0), however large β might be. Thus, β may
to some extent be considered a measure of the value of product- or industry-specific resources, α
of general.12 Both α and β are assumed to be constant over time; per-period profit pii from selling
product θi is therefore constant over time.
13
Note that firm f ’s optimal organizational form, m∗f , equals θf . This is immediate from the
symmetry of both the profit function and the distribution of innovations: both are functions of
|θf −mf |. Firm f in period tf therefore sets mf = θf .
11There is neither cooperation nor competition among agents; this assumption is made for simplicity.
12We borrow the term ‘resources’ from the Resource-Based View of the firm (Penrose, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984).
13Such can be the case even as firm skills increase over time where markets are contestable. Briefly, contestability
requires the firm to pass the benefits of increased skills onto consumers in the form of lower prices; per-period profit
remains constant over time.
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3.2 Spawning and Firm Creation
The innovating firm f need not introduce all new products itself. A new product born of an agent’s
innovation may be more efficiently introduced by a new firm started by the agent who devised the
innovation. We refer to such an outcome as ‘entrepreneurial spawning:’ the agent who devised
the innovation becomes an entrepreneur who starts a new firm; the new firm is spawned from the
innovating firm. Let f+ denote the firm spawned from firm f . Firm f+ is assumed to inherit firm
f ’s values of skills (α) and fit (β).14 The advantage of leaving the introduction of a new product
such as θi to the new firm is that the firm can have organizational form, mf+ , perfectly fitting
the product: mf+ = θi. This increases the profits from selling the new product from α + β ωi to
α + β.15 It does, however, involve a cost, κt, of setting up the new firm. We allow set-up costs to
vary over time; we make specific assumptions on such variation in Sections 6 and 7.1.16
There is a trade-off between organizational fit and set-up cost, the former favoring spawning,
the latter not. Such trade-off leads to the existence of a threshold fit ω∗t such that the introduction
of the new product is left to the spawned firm where ωi ∈ (0;ω∗t ) and to the innovating firm where
ωi ∈ [ω∗t ; 1]: a firm spawns those products that present a lesser fit with the firm’s organizational
form. We derive the expression for ω∗t in Section 4 below. We assume that κt <
β
ρ for all t ≥ tf :
this ensures there is spawning.
Where an agent a ∈ A has devised an innovation θi, agent a bargains with his fellow agents
in A over the value of that innovation. We assume costless bargaining, denote by γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,
the bargaining power of agent a who devised the innovation, and invoke the generalized Nash
bargaining solution to conclude that agent a receives a fraction γ of the value of the innovation he
has devised.17 The remaining fraction, 1−γ, is shared by the other agents, A\{a}. No other party
partakes in the bargaining process: decision power within the firm belongs to those who own and
operate the firm.
In case there should be spawning and agent a start a new firm, f+, agent a likely will devise
other innovations, as will other agents that may join a in f+.18 In order to maintain the centrality
14Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, and Sarkar (2004) provide strong evidence of inheritance by spawned from spawning
firms.
15We assume that the new product always is introduced and that it does not cannibalize existing products. These
assumptions are made for simplicity; they do not alter the nature our results.
16Our results would have been similar had we instead allowed the value of fit, β, to vary over time; the value of
skills, α, will be seen below to have no bearing on the decision to spawn.
17Bargaining power is to a large extent determined by intellectual property rights: γ is large where intellectual
property rights are weak and innovators appropriate much of the value of their innovations.
18We assume agent a’s former colleagues in firm f , A\{a}, have no claim whatsoever on firm f+’s other innovations.
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of organizational fit to our analysis and to avoid imparting any built-in advantage—organizational
fit excepted—to either spawning firm or spawned firm, we assume that both the spawning firm,
f , and the spawned firm, f+, have access to the same ‘innovation technology.’ In the context of
our model and given the assumed homogeneity of agents, the assumption of identical ‘innovation
technology’ implies that firm f+ has i) human capital A+ such that |A+| = |A| = A and ii) cost
of innovation c(qt) per agent in A+. Thus, firm f replaces agent a by another agent; agent a has
A− 1 agents join him in constituting firm f+’s human capital.
As spawning occurs, new firms are born; other firms die. We assume that a firm in existence at
the beginning of period t has probability λ of dying during that period; more formally, we assume
that firm exit follows a Poisson process with exit rate λ ∈ R+ per period. The effective discount
rate, ρ ≡ r+ λ, therefore combines the discount rate r ∈ R+ and the exit rate λ. We denote by Ft
the set of firms in existence at the beginning of period t and by Ft ≡ |Ft| the number of firms in
Ft.
We represent the sequence of events on the time-line in Figure 1. We divide period t into two
subperiods, starting at dates t and t+ , respectively. At date t, each of firm f ’s A agents invests
c(qt). At date t + , agent a ∈ A devises an innovation θi with probability qt. Agent a bargains
with his fellow agents; the innovation is retained or is spawned. In the latter case, agent a departs
to start a new firm, f+; agent a is replaced by a new agent in f ; he is joined by A−1 agents in f+.
4 Solving the Model
Our purpose in the present section is to determine an agent’s probability of innovation, qt, and the
threshold fit, ω∗t . For that purpose, we need to determine the expected value of the innovations
agents will devise, for an individual agent and for all agents.
Consider an innovation θi devised by an agent a, a ∈ A, at date t + . Denote by vint+(ωi)
the value of the innovation if retained within the firm at date t +  and by voutt+ if spawned to a
new firm. Note the dependence of vint+ but not v
out
t+ on ωi, a natural consequence of the choice of
organizational form perfectly fitting θi in the new firm. Recalling that spawning involves set-up
costs κt, we have
vint+(ωi) =
∞∑
τ=1
α+ β ωi
(1 + ρ)τ
=
α+ β ωi
ρ
, (3)
It is possible to relax this assumption, along with the assumption that a firm belongs to the individuals that constitute
its human capital; the greatly increased complexity yields relatively few benefits in added insights.
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and
voutt+ =
∞∑
τ=1
α+ β
(1 + ρ)τ
− κt = α+ β
ρ
− κt . (4)
The expected value at date t of an innovation successfully devised at date t+  is
vt ≡
∫ ω∗t
0
voutt+ dωi +
∫ 1
ω∗t
vint+(ωi) dωi , (5)
where ω∗t remains to be determined. Of this value, agent a, the innovator, receives a fraction γ. As
an innovation is devised successfully with probability qt, the expected value of an innovation before
success at devising the innovation can be ascertained is qt vt.
From the point of view of agent a, the costly choice of an innovation probability qt earns
qt xt in expectation. Agent a’s expected payoff from innovation is not limited to qt xt, however:
agent a profits through bargaining from the innovations devised by his fellow agents.19 Using
the homogeneity of agents, the symmetry of the equilibrium, and the independence of innovation
probabilities across agents and denoting q′t the probability of innovation by each of a’s fellow agents,
the expected value at date t, to agent a, of all innovations devised at date t+  is
qtxt + (A− 1) q′t
vt − xt
A− 1 = qtxt + q
′
t (vt − xt) . (6)
The second term on the LHS represents a’s expected payoff from the innovations devised by his
A − 1 fellow agents: there are (A − 1)q′t such innovations in expectation; each innovation has
total value vt − xt to those A − 1 agents who did not devise the innovation; that value is divided
equally among these A− 1 homogenous agents. The distinction between qt and q′t reflects agent a’s
non-cooperative behavior in choosing innovation probabilities.
Extending to all dates, the expected value at date t, to agent a, of all future innovations is
therefore
V at ≡ maxqt
{
− c(qt) + qt xt + q′t (vt − xt) +
V at+1
1 + ρ
}
, (7)
Observing that qt and q
′
t do not affect V
a
t+1 as innovation probabilities are independent across time,
using Equation (1), and maximizing, we have
qt =
xt
ζ
. (8)
Using the symmetry of the equilibrium to write q′t = qt and therefore qtxt + q′t (vt − xt) = qtvt
and summing over all A agents, we obtain the expected value at date t, to all agents, of all future
19Conversely, a’s fellow agents profit through bargaining from the innovations devised by a.
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innovations
V At ≡ Σa∈AV at = Σa∈A
(
− c(qt) + qt vt +
V at+1
1 + ρ
)
= −Ac(qt) + pt vt +
V At+1
1 + ρ
, (9)
where
pt ≡ Aqt = Axt
ζ
=
xt
ξ
(10)
denotes the date-t expected number of innovations devised at date t+  by all A agents of the firm;
ξ ≡ ζ/A. We refer to pt as the frequency of innovation.
We are now in a position to determine the threshold fit, ω∗t , defined in Section 3.2 and recalled
to be the fit below which new products are spawned and above which they are retained. Consider
the case where a single innovation is devised in period t, by agent a.20 The assumption of costless
bargaining requires that ω∗t be such that
voutt +
V a∈A
+
t+1 + V
A\{a}
t+1
1 + ρ
= vint (ω
∗
t ) +
V At+1
1 + ρ
. (11)
The second term on LHS recognizes that the date t+ 1 value of future innovations to the departing
agent, V a∈A
+
t+1 , will be determined by his being part of the set of agents A+ of the new firm; the
corresponding value to the remaining agents, V
A\{a}
t+1 , likewise reflects agent a’s departure. Note
that neither the agent who would replace a in A in case of spawning nor the agents who would join
a in A+ in that same case are involved in the decision to spawn.
Using the homogeneity of agents and recalling from Equation 3.2 that |A+| = |A| = A, we
have V At = V A
+
t , V
a∈A+
t+1 = V
A+
t+1 /A = V
A
t+1/A, and V
A\{a}
t+1 =
A−1
A V
A
t+1. Combining, we have
V a∈A
+
t+1 + V
A\{a}
t+1 = V
A
t+1. Equation (11) can then be simplified to v
out
t = v
in
t (ω
∗
t ): the threshold
fit for a given innovation depends only on the value of that innovation; it does not depend on the
values of future innovations. We have
Lemma 1 The threshold fit equals
ω∗t = 1−
ρ κt
β
. (12)
A new product with organizational fit ωi < 1− ρ κtβ will be spawned to be introduced by a new
firm; it will be introduced by the innovating firm otherwise. Figure 2 shows the value attributable
to the introduction of a new product, as a function of the product’s fit with the innovating firm’s
20This assumption is without loss of generality: the decision to retain or to spawn is made independently for each
innovation.
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organizational form. The solid line represents the value if the new product should be introduced
by the innovating firm, the dotted line if it should be spawned to be introduced by a new firm.
The threshold fit naturally is that at which the two lines intersect: low-fit products are spawned,
high-fit products are not.
The threshold fit, ω∗t , decreases in the discount rate, ρ, and in the set-up cost, κt; it increases
in the value of organizational fit, β; it is unaffected by the value of skills. This is intuitive.
Products with organizational fit below the threshold will be spawned, so the threshold determines
the frequency of spawning. A higher discount rate and a higher set-up cost increase capitalized
set-up costs, ρκt; higher capitalized set-up costs decrease the attractiveness of spawning, for they
are borne only in case of spawning. The frequency of spawning naturally increases if fit is more
valuable, for only in case of spawning can there be perfect fit between firm organization and product.
The value of skills does not affect the frequency of spawning, for skills have no differential impact
on the value of the product spawned or retained.
Solving Equation (9) forward and using Equations (1), (8), (10), and (12) we obtain
V At =
1
ξ
∞∑
τ=1
xτ
(
vτ − xτ2
)
(1 + ρ)τ
, (13)
where xt = γvt, and where, using Equation (5), we have
vt =
1
ρ
[
α+ β
(
1 + ω∗2t
2
)]
. (14)
We now add the value of those products that were successfully introduced by the firm prior to
date t to obtain the date t value of the firm. It is
WAt =
∑
i∈It
∞∑
τ=1
α+ β ωi
(1 + ρ)τ
+ V At
= It
α+ β ω¯t
ρ
+ V At , (15)
where It will be recalled to denote the number of products in firm f ’s portfolio at date t and ω¯t
represents the average fit between firm f ’s organizational form and the products in its portfolio,
It,
ω¯t ≡ I−1t
∑
i∈It
ωi . (16)
5 Firm Characteristics
In this section, we consider a number of firm characteristics such as the frequency of innovation,
size, focus, and profitability. We then derive their comparative statics; these will be seen to revolve
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around the frequency of spawning, represented by the threshold fit, ω∗t .
• Frequency of Innovation. From Equations (10), (14), and (12), we have
pt =
γ
ξρ
[
α+ β
(
1 + ω∗ 2t
2
)]
. (17)
We obtain
Proposition 1 The frequency of innovation increases in the values of skills (α) and fit (β) and in
the bargaining power of innovators (γ); it decreases in set-up costs (κt).
The results of Proposition 1, as well as those of Propositions 2, 3, and 4 below, are summa-
rized in Table 1, in which we have also reproduced the comparative statics of the frequency of
spawning derived in Section 4.21 The frequency of innovation naturally increases in the values of
skills (dpt/dα > 0) and fit (dpt/dβ > 0): the more profitable innovation, the more is invested in
innovation, the larger the frequency of innovation. In contrast, the frequency of innovation de-
creases in set-up costs (dpt/dκt < 0): higher such costs preclude the attainment of the greater
fit made possible by spawning; they thereby decrease the profitability of, the investment in, and
the frequency of innovation. Finally, the frequency of innovation increases in innovators’ bargain-
ing power (dpt/dγ > 0): higher bargaining power increases an innovator gain from innovation; it
thereby increases the innovator’s incentive to invest in innovation, in turn increasing the frequency
of innovation.
• Firm Size. In our model, firm size at date t is directly proportional to the number of product
successfully introduced by the firm at that date, It. The expected size of firm f at date t equals
E [It] = 1 +
t−1∑
τ=tf+1
pτ (1− ω∗τ ) . (18)
The firm at date t can be expected to have introduced new products and/or spawned new firms in
periods τ , tf < τ < t. Firm size starts at 1, as the firm is born with a single product. We have
Proposition 2 Firm size increases in the value of skills (α), set-up costs (κτ ), and the bargaining
power of innovators (γ); it decreases in the value of fit (β) where α > β/4.
The higher frequency of innovation due to more valuable skills (dpt/dα > 0) or higher bargaining
power (dpt/dγ > 0) increases firm size (dE [It] /dα > 0, dE [It] /dγ > 0): more innovations devised
21We establish but do not discuss the comparative statics with respect to the discount rate (ρ) and the difficulty
of innovation (ξ); these present relatively little interest.
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means more innovations retained where spawning frequency remains unchanged (dω∗t /dα = 0);
more innovations retained in turn means larger size. What is true for the value of skills is not
necessarily true for that of fit: the increase in spawning frequency due to a greater value of fit
(dω∗t /dβ > 0) may offset the increase in innovations following from that greater value (dpt/dβ > 0);
the net effect is indeterminate. A sufficient condition for the former effect to dominate and for size
to decrease in the value of fit (dE [It] /dβ < 0) is that the value of skills not be ‘too small’ relative
to that of fit, α > β/4: if α is not ‘too small’ and pt is not ‘too small,’ the infra-marginal effect of
an increase in the value of fit (−ptdω∗t /dβ < 0) dominates the marginal effect ((1−ω∗t )dpt/dβ > 0).
We shall assume the condition holds in our discussion of the empirical evidence and the testable
implications in Section 8. The opposing effects of decreased spawning frequency (dω∗t /dκτ < 0 for
tf < τ < t) and decreased innovation frequency (dpt/dκτ < 0 for tf < τ < t) also apply in the case
of increased set-up costs, but the former effect always dominates in such case: set-up costs have a
much greater effect on spawning frequency than on the frequency of innovation in our model; size
increases in set-up costs (dE [It] /dκτ > 0 for tf < τ < t).
• Firm Focus. We wish to measure firm f ’s focus, that is, the similarity or dissimilarity of the
products in the firm’s portfolio. One possible measure of focus is the (inverse) average distance
between any two of the firm’s products; another is the distance between the firm’s original product,
θf , and all products subsequently introduced by the firm. Recalling that the firm’s original product
determines that firm’s organizational form, mf = θf , that second measure is the (inverse) average
distance between the firm’s organizational form and each of the firm’s products. A natural measure
of focus is then average organizational fit, I−1t
∑
i∈It ωi , denoted ω¯t in Equation (16). We show
that the expected focus of firm f at a date t equals
E [ω¯t] = 1− 1
2
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ (1− ω∗τ )2
1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ (1− ω∗τ )
. (19)
Firm focus equals 1 at birth, as the single product with which the firm is born determines the firm’s
organizational form, mf = θf . We have
Proposition 3 Firm focus increases in the value of fit (β); it decreases in the value of skills (α),
set-up costs (κτ ), and the bargaining power of innovators (γ).
Focus decreases in the value of skills (dE [ω¯t] /dα < 0) and in bargaining power (dE [ω¯t] /dγ < 0),
a consequence of increased innovation frequency (dpt/dα > 0 and dpt/dγ > 0): the innovations
devised by a firm generically differ from that firm’s organizational form; more innovation implies
more difference, that is, less focus. This effect is offset by increased spawning frequency (dω∗t /dβ >
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0) in the case of an increase in the value of fit: focus increases in the value of fit (dE [ω¯t] /dβ > 0).
The dominant effect spawning frequency also arises in the case of set-up costs: focus decreases
in set-up costs (dE [ω¯t] /dκτ < 0 for tf < τ < t), a consequence of decreased spawning frequency
(dω∗t /dκτ < 0 for tf < τ < t).
• Profitability. We measure the profitability of firm f at date t as the total profit generated by all
products in the firm’s portfolio at that date divided by the number such products. This measure
recalls a firm’s return on assets (ROA). The expected profitability of firm f at date t equals
E [ROAt] ≡ E
[∑
i∈It
pii I
−1
t
]
= α+ β E [ω¯t] . (20)
Firm profitability equals α+ β at birth, as focus then equals 1. We have
Proposition 4 Profitability increases in the value of fit (β); it decreases in set-up costs (κτ ), and
the bargaining position of innovators (γ). Profitability may increase or decrease in the value of
skills (α).
From E [ROAt] = α + β E [ω¯t] in Equation (20), changes in profitability due to changes in
set-up costs and in bargaining power are entirely attributable to changes in focus. The indirect
effect through focus of the value of fit on profitability (βdE [ω¯t] /dβ > 0) is compounded by the
direct effect of the value of fit on profitability (∂E [ROAt] /∂β = E [ω¯t] > 0); profitability increases
in the value of fit (dE [ROAt] /dβ > 0). There is countering rather than compounding for the
value of skills: profitability may increase or decrease in the value of skills (dE [ROAt] /dα ≷ 0);
the indirect effect through focus (βdE [ω¯t] /dα < 0) may or may not be offset by the direct effect
(∂E [ROAt] /∂α = 1 > 0).
6 Spawning Dynamics and the Evolution of Firm Characteristics
We now examine the evolution of firm characteristics over time. We first consider the case of
constant set-up costs. Despite the constancy of set-up costs and other model parameters, firm size,
focus, and profitability evolve over time, a consequence of the firm’s growing portfolio of products.
We then consider the case of increasing set-up costs. We derive the resulting spawning dynamics
and examine their implications for the evolution of firm characteristics.
15
6.1 Baseline Case: Constant Set-Up Cost
We first consider the baseline case of constant set-up costs: κt = κ for all t. The frequencies of
spawning (ω∗t ) and of innovation (pt) clearly are constant over time in such case. Proposition 5
shows that even then, firm size (E [It]), focus (E [ω¯t]), and profitability (E [ROAt]) evolve over time.
Proposition 5 Where set-up costs are constant, firm size increases in age (t) whereas firm focus
and profitability decrease.
Size increases in age (dE [It] /dt > 0) as the firm adds new products to the single product with
which it was born; focus decreases (dE [ω¯t] /dt < 0) as innovations accumulate that are generically
different from firm organizational form.22 The decrease of profitability in age (dE [ROAt] /dt < 0)
is entirely attributable to the decrease of focus in age.23
The result in Proposition 5 that firm profitability decreases in age even as all parameters are
constant can be interpreted as such: older firms’ lower profitability need not imply a decline in the
value of these firms’ resources due some aging process (Loderer and Waelchli, 2009); it may simply
reflect these firms’ application of their constantly valuable resources to a larger, more disparate
portfolio of products.
6.2 Increasing Set-Up Costs
The assumption of constant set-up costs made in Section 6.1 implies that the frequency of spawning
is constant over time. In order to avoid such counter-factual implication (Gompers, Lerner, and
Scharfstein, 2005), we make in the present section the assumption that set-up costs increase over
time:
Assumption K Set-up costs are increasing in time: dκt/dt > 0.
We motivate Assumption K as such: as a new industry develops and firms active in the industry
acquire new knowledge through learning-by-doing for example, it becomes costlier for new firms
seeking to enter the industry to acquire or replicate the body of knowledge these firms would need
in order successfully to operate in the industry; we represent such development in the form of
increasing set-up costs. We have
22Focus is maximal at birth; it tends to the long-run level limt→∞ E [ω¯t] = 1− ρ κ2 β .
23Profitability is maximal at birth; it tends to the long-run level limt→∞ E[ROAt] = α+ β − ρ κ2 .
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Proposition 6 Assume K holds. The frequencies of spawning and of innovation decrease in age
(t), as do firm focus and profitability; firm size increases in age.
The threshold fit, ω∗t , varies over time because the set-up cost, κt, does; the former decreases
over time as the latter increases.24 As the threshold fit determines the spawning frequency, the
frequency of spawning decreases over time. The same holds true of the frequency of innovation,
for the same reason as it does the threshold fit: as noted in the discussion that follows Proposition
1, higher set-up costs discourage innovation by precluding the attainment of the greater fit made
possible by spawning.
Proposition 6 reproduces Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein’s (2005) finding that spawning
decreases in firm age: older firms tend to be active in older industries (Loderer, Neusser, and
Waelchli, 2010), in which set-up costs are higher; these firms devise fewer innovations, of which a
smaller fraction is spawned; the combined effect is to decrease spawning by older firms. Somewhat
similarly to older firms’ lower profitability, these firm’s lesser spawning need not be associated with
some form of decline; it is instead the reflection of the higher cost of setting up new firms in older
industries, as represented by Assumption K.
The results for firm size, focus, and profitability are immediate from Proposition 5 combined
with Propositions 2, 3, and 4, respectively: age’s direct effect is compounded by its indirect effect
through increased set-up costs.
7 Entry
In this section, we examine the extent of entry by spawning and compare the profitability such
entry with diversifying entry.
7.1 Entry by Spawning
We still assume that Assumption K holds. We recall that Ft denotes the number of firms in
existence at the beginning of period t. We denote by Nt the number such firms spawned over the
course of the preceding period, t− 1; we denote by st−1 ≡ pt−1 ω∗t−1 the expected, per-firm number
of innovations devised and spawned over that period. We have E[Ft] = (1 + st−1 − λ)E[Ft−1] and
E [Nt] = st−1E [Ft−1] = st−1
τ=t−2∏
τ=1
(1 + sτ − λ) . (21)
24Formally, we have ∆ω∗t ≡ ω∗t − ω∗t−1 = − ρβ ∆κt < 0, where the inequality is true by ∆κt ≡ κt − κt−1 > 0.
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Our primary interest is in how entry due to spawning—represented by the number of spawned
firms, Nt—varies over time. First-differencing expression (21) and rewriting, we obtain
∆E [Nt] ≡ E [Nt]− E [Nt−1] ≷ 0⇔ st−2 − λ− st−2
st−1
+ 1 ≷ 0 . (22)
Entry due to spawning increases over time where the rate of change in the number of existing
firms dominates the rate of change in the number of innovations devised and spawned. It decreases
otherwise. The term st−2−λ is the rate of change in the number of existing firms between t− 2 to
t− 1. The term st−2/st−1 is the (inverse) rate of change in the number of innovations devised and
spawned. Note that st is decreasing in t, implying that st−2 − λ decreases in t and that st−2/st−1
is larger than 1.25
We define s∞ ≡ limt→∞ st and assume that s∞ < λ. As st decreases in t, this assumption
ensures that there exists some date t′ such that sτ < λ for all τ ≥ t′. This in turn ensures that the
number of existing firms declines for all τ ≥ t′, because
E
[
Ft+1 − Ft
Ft
]
= st − λ. (23)
It is easy to show
Proposition 7 If Assumption K holds and if s∞ < λ, then entry by spawning eventually decreases
over time. Entry by spawning initially increases if s1 − λ > s1/s2 − 1; it decreases monotonically
over time if s1 − λ < s1/s2 − 1.
Proposition 7 can be interpreted as follows: the number of new firms entering the industry
by spawning, pt ω
∗
tFt, depends on the frequency of innovation, the frequency of spawning, and
the number of existing firms from which the new firms are spawned. As both the frequency of
innovation and the frequency of spawning decrease over time, a decrease in the number of entrants
necessarily occurs where there is a decrease in the number of existing firms. A sufficient condition
for such decrease is that s∞ < λ. We know from Condition (22) that there is nonetheless an initial
increase in the number of entrants if s1−λ > s1/s2−1, that is, if in the early stages of the industry
the increase in the number of existing firms offsets the decrease in innovation and in spawning;
there is no such initial increase otherwise.
25The result that st ≡ pt ω∗t is decreasing in t is a direct consequence of the result that pt and ω∗t are decreasing
in t; this follows from Assumption K.
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7.2 Diversifying Entry
We compare the profitability of entry by spawning and diversifying entry. For that purpose, we
distinguish between a firm spawned from a firm already active in the new industry and a firm active
in another industry that decides to diversify into the new industry. We denote the spawned firm’s
values of skills and fit by αs and βs, respectively, and the diversifying firm’s by αd and βd. We
denote by ωis the fit that the spawning firm would have had, had it chosen to introduce the new
product θi itself and by ωid the diversifying firm’s fit. We interpret diversification from another
industry to the new industry to imply ωis > ωid: the organizational form of a firm already active
in the new industry likely is more fitting the new product in that industry than the organizational
form of a firm active in another industry. We no longer require Assumption K. We show
Proposition 8 Where diversifying entry occurs, diversifying firms have lower value of organiza-
tional fit than spawned firms, βd < βs. Spawning entry should therefore be more profitable than
diversifying entry, unless offset by greater value of skills, αd > αs + βs − βdωid > αs.
A ‘revealed-preference’ type argument is used to conclude in the diversifying firm’s lesser value
of fit. Spawning achieves perfect organizational fit; a firm that eschews spawning even as it has
lesser fit, ωid < ωis < 1, reveals relatively little value for fit, βd < βs. The diversifying firm’s lesser
fit and lesser value of fit combine to imply that diversifying entry is less profitable than spawning
entry, unless offset by the diversifying firm’s greater value of skills, αd > αs + βs − βdωid > αs.
Despite the lower profit attributable to fit (βdωid < βs), the diversifying firm may nonetheless reap
higher profit from introducing the new product if it should have greater value of skills: these do
not depend on fit, and, therefore, are not hampered by the diversifying firm’s lesser fit and value
of fit.
8 Empirical Evidence and Testable Implications
We discuss some supporting empirical evidence and derive a number of testable implications. We
first examine the relations between the endogenous variables that are spawning, focus, and prof-
itability and the exogenous variables that are age, set-up costs, and the values of skills. We start
with age (t). Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) find that older firms spawn fewer new firms;
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) find that older firms are more diversified and Loderer and Waelchli
(2009) find that they are less profitable. All three findings are consistent with the predictions of
our model. The exact expression of the frequency of spawning at date t in our model is the product
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st ≡ pt ω∗t defined in Section 7. We know st to be decreasing in t, indirectly through κt; we also
know focus, E [ω¯t], and profitability, E [ROAt], to be decreasing in t.
Regarding that last result, Loderer and Waelchli (2009) attribute the lesser profitability of
older firms to ‘corporate geriatrics.’ What is striking about their result is that ‘old age’ follows
‘birth’ with barely an intervening period of ‘youth:’ their firms suffer not so much from corporate
geriatrics as from ‘corporate Progeria.’26 Our analysis provides an alternative explanation, based on
the decline in spawning, thereby focus, over time. As firms spawn less, they introduce progressively
lesser fitting products, that is, products that present a lesser fit with firm organization; firm focus
declines, as does overall firm performance. Somewhat counter-intuitively perhaps, such decline is
an indication of firm strength rather than weakness: overall performance declines over time because
the range of products for which the innovating firm dominates spawned firms expands over time.
The decline is due entirely the introduction of new products; there is no decline whatsoever in the
profitability of each individual product over time.
Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) find that firms that have higher patent quality spawn
more; Franco and Filson (2006) find that firms that have higher knowhow spawn more. These two
findings are consistent with the predictions of our model, regardless of whether patent quality and
knowhow are viewed as being primarily in the nature of skills, α, or in that of fit, β: pt, ω
∗
t , and
therefore st are increasing in α and in β.
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We now turn to examining the relations among the various endogenous variables that are
spawning, focus, and profitability. The nature of such relations depends crucially on the specific
exogenous variable driving the relations. Consider for example the relation between spawning and
focus. From the results in Section 5 that spawning frequency (ω∗t ), the frequency of innovation
(pt), and focus (E [ω¯t]) increase in the value of fit (β), we conclude that more focused firms spawn
more when spawning is driven by the value of fit. Such is not the case where spawning is driven
by the value of skills (α), for spawning increases whereas focus decreases in that value.28 Thus,
empirical tests that examine the relation between spawning and focus may find contrasting results
depending on whether the relation is driven primarily by the value of fit or that of skills.
26Progeria is an illness that accelerates aging in humans by a factor of 6 to 8. Children born with Progeria die of
heart failure around age 13, early in adolescence, before youth and adulthood.
27An obvious question is how to empirically measure the values of skills and fit. An example for a proxy for skills is
Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein’s (2005) citation-based value of patents; fit on the other hand could e.g. be proxied
by Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang’s (2002) measure of organizational capital.
28Although spawning frequency is unaffected by the value of skills, spawning increases in that value because of
increased innovativeness.
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Our model predicts the following. Where spawning is driven primarily by the value of fit,
smaller, more innovative, and more focused firms spawn more and are more profitable. Where the
driving force is the value of skills and profitability increases in that value, larger, more diversified
firms innovate and spawn more and are more profitable. Where profitability decreases in the value
of skills, larger, more diversified firms innovate and spawn more but are less profitable. These
predictions may help reconcile otherwise contradictory empirical evidence.
Consider for example the relation between size and profitability or, more generally, value.29
Recent studies document a negative relation between these two endogenous variables.30 Yet, this
has not always been so: Hall and Weiss (1967) document a positive such relation for the time
period 1956-1962. The distinction between the value of skills and that of fit may help reconcile these
contrasting results, if profitability should be increasing in the value of skills (dE [ROAt] /dα > 0): it
is conceivable that the relation between size and profitability was driven in earlier periods primarily
by the value of skills; the value of fit only later may have become of primary importance, accounting
for the reversal of the relation.
The same distinction may help account for the contrasting evidence regarding the relation
between focus and profitability or value. Most studies have documented a positive relation, but a
few a have documented a negative relation. In particular, an argument has been made that related
diversification creates value.31 Suppose that the decision to remain focused is driven primarily by a
large value of fit, that to diversify by a large value of skills. Both values increase profitability where
profitability increases in the value of skills (dE [ROAt] /dα > 0), but the former keeps focus high
whereas the latter decreases it. The relation between focus and profitability is therefore positive
when driven by the value of fit, negative when driven by that of skills. To the extent that there
are few truly general skills, and that a diversifying firm’s skills may be more directly applicable
to related than to unrelated industries, the value of skills may account for the positive relation
between related diversification and profitability/value.
We now turn to entry. Proposition 7 establishes that entry by spawning passes the near-litmus
tests of first increasing and then decreasing over time (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Klepper, 1996)
29Note that the comparative statics of profitability, E [ROAt], are the same as those of value,WAt , where profitability
increases in the value of fit (dE [ROAt] /dα > 0). As seen in Equation (15), WAt is the sum of the value of assets
in place and that of growth opportunities, V At . That the former has the same comparative statics in expectation
as E [ROAt] is immediate from the definition of E [ROAt]; that the latter has the same comparative statics follows
from the dependence of V At on xt (see Equation (13)), which can easily be seen from xt’s determination of pt (see
Equation (8)) to have the same comparative statics as E [ROAt] where dE [ROAt] /dα > 0.
30See most recently Loderer and Waelchli (2009).
31See Montgomery (1994) and Villalonga (2004).
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or decreasing throughout (Klepper). Returning to the interpretation of α and β as the values of
general and specific resources, respectively, Proposition 8 shows that it is firms with fewer specific
(lower β) and more general resources (higher α) that are generally the ones that diversify.32 It
also shows that, unless a diversifying entrant has markedly higher skills than a competing spawned
entrant, entry should generally be more profitable to the latter.33
Interestingly, support for Proposition 8 is provided by one instance of a new industry that did
not grow by spawning, consumer electronics in Tokyo. Tokyo’s factories “pour a disproportionate
part of the world’s output of television sets, VCRs, camcorders, smart cameras, laptop computers,
feature telephones, fax machines, CD players, hi-fi amplifiers, music synthesizers, and all the rest
of the electronic cornucopia that [. . . ] seems to flood the entire world” (Hall, 1998, p. 455). Much
of these are produced by long-established firms such as Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu, makers of
electrical goods and telephone and telegraph equipment well before the invention of the transistor.
The contrast with the US is striking: where the new electronics industry brought forth a new set of
firms in the US, the industry to a large extent grew within existing firms in Japan.34 The obvious
question is why.
Proposition 8 suggests one possible answer: diversifying entry dominates where diversifying
firms’ skills—their general resources—are more valuable. Are Japanese firms’ skills more valuable,
then, or were they at least so in the years that saw the industry grow and prosper? There is
some evidence to that effect: there is the view that large Japanese firms’ practice of transferring
researchers and engineers between their research and manufacturing divisions increased horizontal
communication to such an extent as to confer upon large Japanese firms “an extraordinary ability
– long common in small innovative firms, but unusual in large highly structured ones – to combine
different kinds of thinking in the development of new products and new processes ... [ that
made possible] “a process of organizational learning which allows large corporations to enter new
technological fields in an ‘amoeba-like’ way” (Hall, 1998, p. 477). The quote makes clear both the
value and the versatility of Japanese firms’ resources; large, diversified Japanese firms have—or
perhaps had—high αd.
32See for example Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991).
33Klepper and Thompson (2009) show that spawned firms have higher survival probability.
34There were of course some new firms in Japan too, e.g., Sony.
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9 Conclusion
Entrepreneurial spawning is the process whereby an existing firm gives birth to a new firm set up
by one or more employees departed from the existing firm. Although the phenomenon of spawning
itself has been quite extensively studied, its implications for firm characteristics such as size, focus,
profitability, and innovativeness have received little attention. Our paper aims at filling this gap.
We motivate spawning by the desire to achieve organizational fit, that is, the degree to which
a firm’s organization is adapted to the needs of its product portfolio. Spawning occurs where an
employee who develops a new product finds it beneficial to start a new firm to commercialize that
product, because the product presents little fit with the organizational form of the firm at which
the employee originally is employed. There is a trade-off between organizational fit and the cost to
setting up a new firm.
From this basic trade-off, we derive the implications of spawning for firm size, profitability,
focus, and innovativeness. We analyze how the values of firm skills and organizational fit, the cost
of setting up a new firm, firm age, and the bargaining power of innovating employees affect the
aforementioned firm characteristics. Firms that have higher value of skills spawn more, as do firms
that have higher value of organizational fit. As firms mature, they spawn less and devise fewer
innovations, they are less profitable and more diversified. Focus and profitability are positively
related where spawning is driven by the value of organizational fit; they may be negatively related
where spawning is driven by the value of firm skills.
We examine the extent and the profitability of entry by spawning into a new industry. In line
with extant empirical findings, we show that entry by spawning is more profitable than diversifying
entry. Our model accounts for much of the empirical evidence on the relation between spawning
and firm characteristics; it suggests new empirical tests based upon the distinction between the
value of skills and that of fit.
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Appendix
Proof of (8): Differentiating (7) with respect to qt , using (1), and recalling that V at+1 does not depend
on qt , we have
∂ V at
∂ qt
= xt − pt ξ; equating to 0 we obtain qt = xt/ζ.
Proof of (14): Evaluating vt in Equation (5), we obtain
vt =
α+ β
ρ
− κt − (1− ω∗t )
[
β
ρ
(
1− ω∗t
2
)
− κt
]
. (24)
From (12), we have κt =
β
ρ (1− ω∗t ). Substituting κt into (24), yields (14).
Proof of (18): A new product is introduced at date τ +  with probability pτ (1− ω∗τ ) by the innovating
firm. Aggregating products introduced over time yields E [It] = 1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ (1− ω∗τ ).
Proof of (19): Calculate E [ω¯t] as the weighted average of every period’s expected product fit
E [ω¯t] =
1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ
∫ 1
ω∗τ
ωi dωi
1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ
∫ 1
ω∗τ
dωi
=
1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ (1− ω∗τ )
(
1 − 1−ω∗τ2
)
1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ (1− ω∗τ )
, (25)
which yields (19).
Proof of Propositions 1 to 4: Using pt in (10), vt in (14) and ω∗τ in (12), we have
pt =
γ
ξ ρ
[
α+
β
2
(
1 +
[
1− ρκt
β
]2)]
. (26)
It is immediate that dptdα > 0,
dpt
dβ > 0,
dpt
dκt
< 0, dptdρ < 0,
dpt
dγ > 0, and
dpt
dξ < 0. Substitute ω
∗
τ in (12) into
pτ (1− ω∗τ ) to obtain
pτ (1− ω∗τ ) =
γκτ
2 ξ
[
2α
β
+
(
1 +
[
1− ρκτ
β
]2)]
. (27)
Substitute pτ (1− ω∗τ ) in (27) into (25) to obtain
E [ω¯t] = 1− 1
2
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
γκτ
2ξ
[
2α
β +
(
1 + ω∗2τ
)]
(1− ω∗τ )
1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
γκτ
2ξ
[
2α
β + (1 + ω
∗2
τ )
] . (28)
Denote L ≡ γ2 ξ , Mt ≡
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1−ω∗τ ), Nt ≡
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
andQt ≡
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ
2α
β .
Then E [ω¯t] = 1 − 12 L (Mt+Qt)1+L (Nt+Qt) .
Substitute pτ (1− ω∗τ ) in (27) into E [It] = 1 +
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
pτ (1− ω∗τ ) to obtain
E [It] = 1 +
t−1∑
τ=tf+1
γκτ
2ξ
[
2α
β
+
(
1 + ω∗2τ
)]
. (29)
Then E [It] = 1 + L (Nt +Qt).
• For Ξ ∈ {α, β, ρ}, we have dE[ω¯t]dΞ = E(Ξ), where
E(Ξ) ≡ −L At(Ξ)
2 (1 + L (Nt +Qt))
2 , (30)
At(Ξ) ≡ (1 + L (Nt +Qt))dMt
dΞ
− L (Mt +Qt) dNt
dΞ
+ (1 + L (Nt −Mt))dQt
dΞ
. (31)
24
Now, 1+L (Nt+Qt) > 0, L (Mt+Qt) > 0 and 1+L (Nt−Mt) > 0 (given thatNt−Mt =
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
ω∗τ >
0). Also, dMtdΞ = −
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
2ω∗ 2τ + (1− ω∗τ )2
)
dω∗τ
dΞ ,
dNt
dΞ = 2
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ ωτ
dω∗τ
dΞ and
dQt
dΞ = 2
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ
d(α/β)
dΞ .
– For Ξ = α: We have
dω∗τ
dα = 0 and
d(α/β)
dα =
1
β . So,
dMt
dα =
dNt
dα = 0 and
dQt
dα =
2
β
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ > 0. Therefore,
At(α) > 0. Consequently,
dE[ω¯t]
dα < 0.
Furthermore, dE[ROAt]dα = 1 + β
dE[ω¯t]
dα = 1 − L (1+L (Nt−Mt))(1+L (Nt+Qt))2
∑t−1
τ=tf+1
κτ , where only Qt is increasing in α.
So, there exists an α∗ such that dE[ROAt]dα < 0 for all α < α
∗, and dE[ROAt]dα ≥ 0 for all α ≥ α∗.
Finally, dE[It]dα = L
(
dNt
dα +
dQt
dα
)
> 0.
– For Ξ = β: We have
dω∗τ
dβ =
ρ κt
β2 > 0 and
d(α/β)
dβ =
−α
β2 < 0. So,
dMt
dβ < 0,
dNt
dβ > 0 and
dQt
dβ < 0. Therefore,
At(β) < 0. Consequently,
dE[ω¯t]
dβ > 0. Furthermore,
dE[ROAt]
dβ = β
dE[ω¯t]
dβ + E [ω¯t] > 0.
dE [It]
d β
=
t−1∑
τ=tf+1
γκτ
ξ
[
− α
β2
+
[
1 − ρ κτ
β
]
ρ κt
β2
]
=
t−1∑
τ=tf+1
γκτ
βξ
[
−α
β
+ (1 − ω∗τ )ω∗τ
]
. (32)
Therefore, dE[It]dβ < 0 iff −α/β+ [1 − ω∗τ ]ω∗τ < 0 for all τ . The sufficient condition α/β > 1/4 is obtained by
noting that [1 − ω∗τ ]ω∗τ is maximized at ω∗τ = 1/2.
– For Ξ = ρ: We have
dω∗τ
d ρ =
−κt
β < 0 and
d (α/β)
d ρ = 0. So,
dMt
d ρ > 0,
dNt
d ρ < 0 and
dQt
d ρ = 0.
Therefore, At(ρ) > 0. Consequently,
dE[ω¯t]
d ρ < 0. Furthermore,
dE[ROAt]
d ρ = β
dE[ω¯t]
d ρ < 0. Finally,
dE[It]
d ρ = L
(
dNt
d ρ +
dQt
d ρ
)
< 0.
• For κτ , where τ ∈ (tf , t), we have dE[ω¯t]dκτ = E(κτ ). Here, dMtdκτ =
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1−ω∗τ )−κτ
(
2ω∗ 2τ + (1− ω∗τ )2
)
dω∗τ
dκτ
,
dNt
dκτ
=
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
+2κτ ωτ
dω∗τ
dκτ
and dQtdκτ = 2
α
β > 0. As
dω∗τ
dκτ
= −ρβ =
−(1−ω∗τ )
κτ
, we have, dMtdκτ = 2
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1−
ω∗τ ) > 0,
dNt
dκτ
= ω∗ 2τ + (1− ω∗τ )2 > 0. Then,
At(κτ ) = 2
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1− ω∗τ ) + (1 + L (Nt −Mt)) 2
α
β
+ L (Nt +Qt))
[
2
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1− ω∗τ )
] − L (Mt +Qt) [ω∗ 2τ + (1− ω∗τ )2] . (33)
The first two terms on the RHS of (33) are positive. Now, Nt ≥ Mt and 2
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1− ω∗τ ) ≥ 2− 2ωτ +
2ω∗ 2τ ≥ ω∗ 2τ +(1− ω∗τ )2. So, the sum of the last two terms on the RHS of (33) is positive. Therefore, At(κτ ) >
0. Consequently, dE[ω¯t]dκτ < 0. Furthermore,
dE[ROAt]
dκτ
= β dE[ω¯t]dκτ < 0. Finally,
dE[It]
dκτ
= L
(
dNt
dκτ
+ dQtdκτ
)
> 0.
• For Ξ ∈ {γ, ξ}, We have dω∗τdΞ = 0, so dMtdΞ = dNtdΞ = 0, and dQtdΞ = 0. Then dLdγ = 12ξ and dLdξ = −γ2ξ2 . Now,
E [ω¯t] = 1 − 12 Mt+QtL−1+Nt+Qt , E [It] = 1 +L (Nt +Qt) and E [ROAt] = α+β
(
1 − 12 Mt+QtL−1+Nt+Qt
)
. Therefore,
dE[ω¯t]
dγ < 0,
dE[It]
dγ > 0, and
dE[ROAt]
dγ < 0. Also,
dE[ω¯t]
dξ > 0,
dE[It]
dξ < 0, and
dE[ROAt]
dξ > 0.
Proof of Propositions 5 and 6: Building on the proof of Propositions 1 to 4, denote ∆E [ω¯t] ≡
E [ω¯t] − E [ω¯t−1] and Kt ≡ Nt −Mt. Given that ∆Mt ≡ Mt −Mt−1 = κt−1
(
1 + ω∗ 2t−1
)
(1 − ω∗t−1), ∆Nt ≡
Nt−Nt−1 = κt−1
(
1 + ω∗ 2t−1
)
, ∆Qt ≡ Qt−Qt−1 = κt−1 2αβ , and ∆Kt ≡ Kt−Kt−1 = κt−1
(
1 + ω∗ 2t−1
)
ω∗t−1,
we obtain
∆E [ω¯t] =
L
(
L∆Nt
[
Mt−1 − ∆Mt∆Nt Nt−1
]
+ L∆Qt
[
∆Kt
∆Qt
Qt−1 − Kt−1
]
−∆Mt −∆Qt
)
2 [1 + L (Nt +Qt)] [1 + L (Nt−1 +Qt−1)]
. (34)
In the case κτ = κ for all τ , Kt−1 = ∆Kt∆Qt Qt−1 and Mt−1 =
∆Mt
∆Nt
Nt−1. In the Case κτ > κτ−1
for all τ , Kt−1 =
∑t−2
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
ω∗τ >
∑t−2
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
1 + ω∗ 2t−1
)
ω∗t−1 =
∆Kt
∆Qt
Qt−1 and Mt−1 =
25
∑t−2
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1−ω∗τ ) <
∑t−2
τ=tf+1
κτ
(
1 + ω∗ 2τ
)
(1−ω∗t−1) = ∆Mt∆Nt Nt−1. So in both cases, ∆E [ω¯t] <
0. Denoting ∆E [ROAt] ≡ E [ROAt]− E [ROAt−1] = β∆E [ω¯t], we have ∆E [ROAt] < 0. Finally, denoting
∆E [It] ≡ E [It]− E [It−1], we have ∆E [It] = L (∆Nt + ∆Qt) > 0.
Proof of (22): From (21), we have
∆E [Nt] ≡ E [Nt]− E [Nt−1] = [st−1 (1 + st−2 − λ)− st−2]
τ=t−3∏
τ=1
(1 + sτ − λ) , (35)
from which (22) is immediate.
Proof of Proposition 8: That the firm already active in the new industry chooses to spawn implies
ωis < 1− ρκtβs . That the diversifying firm chooses not to spawn implies ωid > 1−
ρκt
βd
.
Together with the inequality ωis > ωid, the two preceding inequalities imply βs > βd. The per period profit
to the spawned firm from introducing product θi is αs + βs; that to the diversifying firm is αd + βdωid. As
ωid < 1 and βd < βs, it is clear that αd + βdωid < αs + βs, unless αd > αs + βs − βdωid > αs.
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